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Section 1.20(37) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law
("CPL") defines a lesser included offense as follows:
When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without
concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense
of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a
"lesser included offense." In any case in which it is legally
possible to attempt to commit a crime, an attempt to commit such
crime constitutes a lesser included offense with respect thereto.'
Judges and practitioners must apply this definition in several
situations during criminal proceedings. Identification of lesser in-
cluded offenses is critical to: (a) the prosecutor's decision con-
cerning the charges to bring against one or more defendants, (b)
plea bargaining, (c) motions to reduce or dismiss an indictment,
(d) motions for a trial order of dismissal, and (e) the judge's final
charge to the jury.
Because of the relative infancy of environmental criminal pros-
ecution, members of the New York legal community have had
limited opportunities to apply lesser included offense analysis to
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1. N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(37) (McKinney 1996) ("CPL").
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environmental crimes.' This Article provides a reference guide
for judges and practitioners to use in identifying the lesser includ-
ed environmental offenses. Part I briefly examines the scope of
New York's lesser included offense doctrine. Part II surveys the
contexts in which identification of lesser included offenses is
critical. Finally, Part III, by applying the lesser included offense
analysis to each criminal statute in the New York Environmental
Conservation Law, identifies the environmental lesser included
offenses and compiles these offenses into a series of useful charts
and tables.
I. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
DOCTRINE
The lesser included offense doctrine set forth in section
1.20(37) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law mandates that
a putative lesser included offense ("LIO") satisfy two re-
quirements with respect to a "greater offense."3
First, the alleged LIO must be of a lesser grade or degree than
the greater offense. This requirement is fulfilled if the criminal
penalty under the purported LIO is less severe than the penalty
under the greater offense. Thus, a class E felony can be a LIO of
a class D felony because the penalty under the former is less
severe than under the latter.
It should be noted that the "lesser grade" requirement repre-
sents an expansion of the scope of the LIO doctrine.4 The former
New York CPL required a LIO to be a lesser degree ("0") of an-
other offense, as, for example, Fourth Degree Burglary is a lesser
degree than Third Degree Burglary. In contrast, under the present
CPL, a LIO may be a lesser degree of or grade than a greater
2. In the early 1970s there were few reported criminal prosecutions of envi-
ronmental crimes. Since a 1972 recodification of the Environmental Conservation
Law, the number of environmental criminal sanctions has increased significantly.
See Rocky Piaggione, State Statutory Provisions, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES,
121-144 (New York State Bar Association 1995).
3. A lesser included offense is defined, pursuant to CPL § 1.20(37), in rela-
tion to another offense, referred to as a "greater offense" or "charged offense."
4. See generally, Bernard E. Gegan, Lesser Included Crimes Under Felony
Murder Indictments in New York: The Past Speaks to the Present, 66 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 329, § V (1992).
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offense. This liberalizing modification enables an offense, such as
Third Degree Criminal Trespass (a B misdemeanor) to be a LIO
of Third Degree Burglary (a D felony), though the offenses are
not different degrees of the same crime.5
If the putative LIO meets the lesser grade requirement with
respect to another offense, it then must pass the "impossibility
test." The test is satisfied when, according to section 1.20(37) of
the CPL, it is theoretically "impossible to commit the greater
offense without concomitantly committing" the purported LIO.6
For practical purposes, the test can be considered as follows: if
any hypothetical scenario exists that would establish the greater
offense but not the purported LIO, then the latter fails the impos-
sibility test.
Consider, for example, whether under the impossibility test,
Second Degree Unlawful Possession of Hazardous Wastes, Subdi-
vision One ("Possession 20(1)") is a LIO of the greater offense
of Possession 10(1). A defendant is guilty of the putative LIO, a
class E felony, when he "knowingly possess[es] more than one-
hundred gallons... of an aggregate weight or volume of hazard-
ous wastes at a place other than the site of generation."7 A de-
fendant is guilty of the greater offense, a class D felony, when he
"knowingly possess[es] acute hazardous wastes at a place other
than the site of generation."'
A hypothetical defendant is guilty of the greater offense, Pos-
session 10(1), if we assume he knowingly possesses ten gallons
of an acute hazardous waste at a place other than the site of
generation.' However, such a defendant is not guilty of the puta-
tive LIO, Possession 20(1), because the defendant does not pos-
sess "greater than 100 gallons" of the waste. Because a hypotheti-
cal situation exists whereby a defendant can commit the greater
crime without concomitantly committing the lesser, the putative
5. See People v. Henderson, 359 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1976) (third de-
gree criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of third degree burglary).
6. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(37); see also People v. Green, 437 N.E.2d
1146, 1148 (N.Y. 1982).
7. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2707(1) (McKinney 1996).
8. Id. § 71-2709(1).
9. By definition, every acute hazardous waste is also a hazardous waste. See
id. § 27-0908(1)(c).
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LIO fails the impossibility test.
As shown by the foregoing analysis, the impossibility test
requires a comparison of the statutory elements of the purported
LIO and the greater offense."° An "offense" is prohibited con-
duct, defined by a section of a criminal code." Therefore, to
perform the impossibility test, it is necessary to compare the
elements of the criminal sections that define the putative LIO and
10. See People v. Glover, 439 N.E.2d 376, 377 (N.Y. 1982) (theoretical
impossibility is determined '"by a comparative examination of the statutes defin-
ing the two crimes, in the abstract") rev'g People v. Hayes, 43 A.D.2d 99, 101
(1973) (word impossible means "an impossibility under the facts of the case on
trial, not under some hypothetical alternative variety of crime charged"). See ge-
nerally, Janis L. Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser In-
cluded Offense, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 191 (1984), § IA (defining the statutory-
comparison standard), § IC (defining the factual-based standard). See Gegan,
supra note 4, § IV. The United States Supreme Court applies the current New
York impossibility standard. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 714-20
(1989) (rejecting the factual-based impossibility standard in favor of the statutory-
comparison standard).
11. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(1) (McKinney 1996). As in the Penal Law
almost all offenses under the Environmental Conservation Law ("ECL") are de-
fined by subdivisions of statutes. However, certain statutory subdivisions, such as
ECL § 71-1933(3) and (4), are themselves subdivided. For these subdivisions, it
appears that LIO analysis should apply at the statutory level that most narrowly
defines the offenses in question. For example, the offense defined by § 71-
1933(3)(a)(i), committed when a person with criminal negligence violates any
provision of title 7 or 8 of article 17, is a LIO of the offense defined by § 71-
1933(4)(a)(i), committed when a person knowingly performs the same conduct.
See infra part III (c).
More ambiguous are subdivisions that are not themselves divided further, as
each subdivision of ECL § 71-1933 is divided, yet appear to define multiple of-
fenses. For example, Subdivisions One and Two of First Degree Endangering
Public Health, Safety or the Environment (ECL § 71-2714), and Subdivision Two
of Second Degree Endangering Public Health, Safety or the Environment (ECL
§ 71-2713) appear to define multiple offenses, but are not separately enumerated
or denoted by letter. However, close scrutiny reveals that each subdivision actual-
ly defines only a single offense. The subdivisions simply contain two separate
definitions for "acutely hazardous substances." While statutory amendment to
clear up any ambiguity would be welcome, for LIO purposes, it is clear that
Subdivision Two of Second Degree Endangering Public Health, Safety or the
Environment is a LIO of both Subdivisions One and Two of First Degree Endan-
gering. See infra part III (A)(3).
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the greater offense.'"
If the elements of the purported LIO are a subset of elements
of the greater offense, then any hypothetical conduct that consti-
tutes the greater offense will also constitute the LIO; thus, the
putative LIO will pass the impossibility test. If, however, one or
more elements of the putative LIO are not identical to an element
of the greater offense, then the impossibility test will be satisfied
only if an element of the greater. offense subsumes the element
unique to the putative LIO.3
Consider, for example, the impossibility test applied to Second
Degree Unlawful Possession of Medical Waste, Subdivision Two
("Possession of Medical Waste 20(2)") as a potential LIO of
Possession of Medical Waste 10(1). A defendant is guilty of the
putative LIO, a class A misdemeanor, when he "[1] recklessly [2]
possess[es] [3] more than forty gallons ... of an aggregate
weight or volume of [4] regulated medical waste [5] at a place
other than the facility at which such waste was generated." 4 A
defendant is guilty of the greater offense, a class E felony, when
he "[1] knowingly and intentionally [2] possess[es] [3] more than
three hundred gallons... of an aggregate weight or volume of
[4] regulated medical waste [5] at a place other than the facility
at which such waste was generated."' 5 As can readily be seen,
the first and third elements of the putative LIO are not elements
of the greater offense.
To apply the impossibility test, first consider the mens rea
element of the putative LIO with respect to the greater offense.
Any element that embodies a culpable mental state is necessarily
subsumed by an offense involving a higher culpable mental
12. See People v. Green, 437 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (N.Y. 1982).
13. See People v. Van Norstrand, 647 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (N.Y. 1984). When
an element that is unique to the lesser offense passes the impossibility test with
respect to the greater offense, the greater offense has "subsumed" the unique ele-
ment of the lesser offense. See also People v. Deitsch, 97 A.D.2d 327, 328-29
(N.Y. 1983) (when only one element of a purported LIO is not an element of a
greater offense and that element is subsumed by the greater offense, the putative
LIO passes the impossibility test).
14. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-4403(2).
15. Id. § 71-4404(2).
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state.' 6 Section 15.05 of the New York Penal Law defines the
degrees of culpability as follows, from highest to lowest: inten-
tionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with criminal negligence. The
New York Courts have adopted a practical, rather than theoreti-
cal, approach to applying the impossibility test to the mens rea
elements of putative LIOs, thereby rejecting the argument that the
culpable mental states are mutually exclusive. The courts perceive
the mental states of section 15.00 as "fine gradations along but a
single spectrum of culpability."' 7 For example, acting with crim-
inal negligence (failing to perceive a risk) may appear, theoreti-
cally, to preclude acting recklessly (perceiving a risk and ignoring
it). Utilizing a practical approach, however, the courts dictate that
the mental states are "but a shade apart on a scale of criminal
culpability ... if one acts with criminal recklessness, he is at
least criminally negligent."' 8
In the medical waste example above, the element of "reckless-
ness" represents a less culpable mental state than that of "know-
ingly or intentionally." Thus, the latter, an element of the greater
offense, subsumes the former, an element of the purported LIO.
The next step in the medical waste example is to determine
whether the third element of the putative LIO - the element
representing the 40 gallons of medical waste possessed - is
subsumed by the greater offense which requires that greater than
300 gallons of waste be possessed. Clearly, if a defendant pos-
sesses 300 gallons of medical waste, such a defendant must pos-
sess 40 gallons of medical waste as well.
Accordingly, a comparison of the elements of the medical
waste possession example establishes that no hypothetical conduct
exists that would constitute the greater offense, but not the puta-
tive LIO. As such, Possession of Medical Waste 20(2) is a LIO
of Possession of Medical Waste 10(1).
16. See People v. Green, 437 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (N.Y. 1982).
17. People v. Stanfield, 330 N.E.2d 75, 78 (N.Y. 1975).
18. Id. at 77.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
II. CONTEXTS IN WHICH IDENTIFICATION OF LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES ARE CRITICAL
A. Charging Decisions
When determining the particular crimes with which a criminal
defendant should be charged, whether by indictment or informa-
tion, prosecutors must be cognizant of the LIO framework behind
the crimes under consideration. If the evidence supports an of-
fense and one or more of its LIOs, prosecutors have tremendous
discretion in choosing the specific charges to bring. This choice
can often dramatically impact the course of the case. Prosecutors
must base their decisions on numerous factors, including the
strength of their case and the likelihood that the defendant will
evoke sympathy from a jury. Before a prosecutor can consider the
nuances of these strategic charging decisions, however, the prose-
cutor must know with certainty which crimes are LIOs of other
crimes.
B. Plea Bargaining
Identifying LIOs is also an essential part of the plea bargaining
process. A defendant can plead guilty to either a charged offense
or a LIO of the charged offense. 9 Such restriction on plea bar-
gaining protects the defendant's constitutional right to answer
only to charges made against him by a grand jury in an indict-
ment. 0 However, the definition of a LIO in the plea bargaining
context involves an expanded definition of section 1.20(37) of the
CPL.2' An LIO is defined under section 220.20 of the CPL as
follows:
(1) a lesser included offense ... relating to the entry of a plea of
guilty to an offense of lesser grade than one charged in a count of
an indictment means not only a "lesser included offense" as that
term is defined in subdivision 37 of section 1.20, but also one
which is deemed to be pursuant to the following rules:
19. See People v. Martin, 57 N.E.2d 53, 54 (N.Y. 1944).
20. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
21. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.20 (meaning of lesser included offense
for plea purposes).
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(j) where the offense charged is unlawful disposal of
hazardous wastes in violation of section 27-0914 of the Environ-
mental Conservation Law, any offense of unlawful disposal or
possession of hazardous wastes as set forth in sections 71-2707,
71-2709, 71-2711, and 71-2713 of such law, in any degree, is
deemed to constitute a lesser included offense;
(k) where the offense charged is unlawful possession of hazardous
wastes in violation of section 27-0914 of the Environmental Con-
servation Law, any offense of unlawful possession of hazardous
wastes as set forth in sections 71-2707 and 71-2709 of such law,
in any degree, is deemed to constitute a lesser included offense.22
This expansion 3 is permissible in the context of plea bargaining
because a guilty plea is bargained for as a benefit to the defen-
dant after negotiation between the prosecution and defense.24
Indeed, a defendant's guilty plea may be valid even though the
offense pleaded to is neither a charged offense nor a lesser in-
cluded offense of the charged offense.25 Where the defendant
has entered into a plea agreement voluntarily and knowingly, and
where no jurisdictional defects exist, accepting a plea to an un-
charged offense that is not a lesser included offense constitutes a
harmless error.'
22. Subdivisions (a) through (k) expand the lesser included offense doctrine of
§ 1.20(37) as it pertains to particular offenses. Only subdivisions (j) and (k) in-
volve expansion of the doctrine with respect to environmental offenses. Clearly
subdivisions (j) and (k), effective September 1, 1981, were intended to apply to
ECL sections prior to several amendments of those sections. Such amendments
render this CPL section meaningless as the section relates to the current versions
of these article 71 crimes.
23. In any other context, this expansion would infringe upon the defendant's
right to be convicted only of a charged offense or a lesser included offense of the
charged offense pursuant to CPL § 1.20(37).
24. See Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.20
(McKinney 1993); see also People v. Johnson, 636 N.Y.S.2d 282 (N.Y.A.D. 1st
Dept. 1995).
25. People v. Mathie, 599 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y.A.D. 2d Dept. 1993).
26. Id. at 44.
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C. Motion to Dismiss or Reduce After Arraignment
Identification of lesser included offenses is critical when a
defendant moves to dismiss or reduce an indictment pursuant to
section 210.20 of the CPL:
(1) After arraignment upon an indictment, the superior
court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss such indictment
or any count thereof upon the ground that:
(b) The evidence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient
to establish the offense charged or any lesser included offense;
(1-a) After arraignment and upon indictment, if the superior court,
upon motion of the defendant ... challenging the legal sufficiency
of the evidence before the grand jury, finds that the evidence
before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to establish the
commission by the defendant of the offense charged in any count
contained within the indictment, but was legally sufficient to estab-
lish the commission of a lesser included offense, it shall order the
count or counts of the indictment with respect to which the finding
is made reduced to allege the most serious lesser included offense
with respect to which the evidence before the grand jury was suffi-
cient.27
When a defendant moves to dismiss or reduce an indictment,
the court conducts a three-part inquiry." First, the court deter-
mines whether the evidence before the grand jury is legally suffi-
cient to support the offenses charged in the indictment. 9 Unless
the defendant can establish a "clear showing of insufficiency" of
the evidence, the court will not dismiss or reduce the indict-
ment.
30
Second, if the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the
27. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20(l)(b), (1-a) (emphasis added).
28. Id. § 210.20. See generally, George M. Heymann, Motions to Reduce
Indictments: An Analysis, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 1990 at 1, col. 1.
29. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20(l)(b). Evidence before the grand jury is
legally sufficient to support the charged offense if, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence establishes every element of the
charged offense. Such evidence may be legally sufficient even if it does not pro-
vide "reasonable cause" to believe that the defendant committed the charged of-
fense. People v. Deitsch, 97 A.D.2d 327, 329 (N.Y. 1983).
30. Id.
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charged offense, then the court must determine whether a LIO of
the charged offense exists.3 The LIO must satisfy the two re-
quirements of section 1.20(37): (1) the offense must be of lesser
grade or degree than the charged offense and (2) must satisfy the
impossibility test.3"
Third, if one or more LIOs exist, the court must determine
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a LIO.33 If
the evidence does not support the charged offense, but does sup-
port one or more LIOs, the court must grant a motion to reduce
the indictment to the highest LIO.34
Prior to a 1990 amendment adding subdivision 1-a to section
210.20, a court could only grant or deny a motion to dismiss an
indictment. As long as the evidence against a defendant was
sufficient to support either the charged offense or any LIO of the
charged offense, a motion to dismiss was denied. The court could
not reduce the charge against a defendant. Pursuant to the amend-
ment, however, a court can reduce a charge - when the evidence
is not sufficient to support it - to the most serious LIO that the
evidence establishes.35
Following an order of a court reducing an indictment, the pros-
ecution can, within thirty days, (a) file a reduced indictment, (b)
resubmit the charged offense to the Grand Jury, or (c) appeal the
order.36
Identification of LIOs in the context of motions to dismiss or
31. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20 (1)(b).
32. See supra, part I.
33. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20(1-a); see also CPL § 210.20(1)(b) (stan-
dard for legal sufficiency).
34. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20 (1-a).
35. Id. Compare People v. Maier, 72 A.D.2d 754 (N.Y. 1979) (prior to
amendment, § 210.20 "does not authorize a reduction of a charged contained in
the indictment to a lesser included offense") with People v. Zodda, 580 N.Y.S. 2d
971, 972 (N.Y.A.D. 1st Dept. 1991) (after amendment, § 210.20 "permits the
court to reduce any count contained within the indictment where the evidence is
legally insufficient to establish the crime charged but legally sufficient to estab-
lish the commission of a lesser included offense). See generally, Heymann, supra
note 28.
36. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20(6); see People v. Ferguson, 602
N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. Sup. 1993) (failure of prosecution to act pursuant to §
210.20(6) results in dismissal of reduced count).
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reduce is essential to both the prosecution and the defense.37
Subdivision 1(b) of CPL section 210.20 protects the prosecution's
case from dismissal when the evidence fails to establish the
charged offense, but does establish a LIO.38 Subdivision 1-a pro-
tects a defendant from being overcharged in an indictment. 9
This protection benefits the defendant in plea negotiations and at
trial.' The reduction of charges in an indictment also functions
to reduce the minimum degree of charges to which a defendant
can plead guilty." Additionally, at trial, the reduction of an in-
dictment ensures that the defendant will be convicted only of an
offense that was established during the grand jury proceeding.42
Both subdivisions 1(b) and 1-a provide the court with the "flex-
ibility to do justice" by denying dismissal when the adduced
evidence supports a LIO, and by reducing an indictment to reflect
the offense that the evidence actually establishes.43
D. Trial Order of Dismissal
At the close of the prosecution's case or at the conclusion of
all the evidence, a defendant may move to dismiss one or more
of the charges against him. Pursuant to CPL section 290.10, the
court may "issue a "trial order of dismissal," dismissing any
count of an indictment upon the ground that the trial evidence is
not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or
any lesser included offense."'  In this context, the court con-
ducts a similar three-part inquiry to that used under section
210.20: (1) determine if the evidence is legally sufficient to sup-
port the charged offense, (2) if not, identify any LIOs of the
charged offense, and (3) determine if the evidence is legally
37. See generally, Heymann, supra note 28.
38. See People v. Adorno, 112 A.D.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. 1985).
39. See Preiser, supra note 24.
40. See People v. Jackson, 588 N.Y.S.2d 88 (N.Y. Sup. 1992).
41. See Heyman, supra note 28.
42. See Preiser, supra note 24.
43. See Heymann, supra note 28, at 1 (quoting Legislative Statement in sup-
port of Chapter 209, McKinney's Session Law News of New York No. 5, Aug.
1990, p.A-387).
44. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 290.10(A).
19961 747
748 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
sufficient to support at least one such LIO.45 If the evidence sup-
ports any LIO, then the charged offense cannot be dismissed or
reduced. Therefore, unlike the current section 210.20, which per-
mits the court to reduce a charge to a LIO under these circum-
stances, section 290.10 is identical to the pre-1990 version of
section 210.20.
E. Charging the Jury
Lesser included offense analysis plays a significant role when a
judge charges the jury. Section 300.50 of the CPL authorizes sub-
mission of a LIO of a charged crime to a jury under limited
circumstances:
(1) In submitting a count of an indictment to the jury, the court in
its discretion may, in addition to submitting the greatest offense
which it is required to submit, submit in the alternative any lesser
included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence
which would support a finding that the defendant committed such
lesser offense, but did not commit the greater...
(2) If the court is authorized by subdivision one to submit a lesser
included offense and is requested by either party to do so, it must
do so. In the absence of such a request, the court's failure to sub-
mit such offense does not constitute error.4
Upon request of either party, the court must submit to the jury
any LIO in addition to the charged offense, if the LIO satisfies
two requirements. 47 First, the LIO must conform to the LIO def-
inition of section 1.20(37).' Second, a reasonable view of the
evidence must exist that would permit a finding that the defen-
dant committed the LIO, but did not commit the charged of-
fense.49
While the first requirement mandates the abstract analysis of
the criminal statutes described in part I of this Article, the second
involves evaluation of the evidence before the court. For this
45. See supra, part II (C).
46. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.50(1), (2).
47. People v. Norstrand, 647 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (N.Y. 1984).
48. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.50, § 1.20(37); see supra part I.
49. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.50; People v. Green, 437 N.E.2d 1148,
1150-51 (N.Y. 1982).
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exercise, the evidence must be considered in the light most favor-
able to the defendant." The court does not weigh the persuasive-
ness of the evidence.5 The requirement is satisfied when the
evidence supports "on a rational basis" a theory under which the
defendant committed the LIO and not the greater offense.52 The
LIO fails the evidentiary requirement only if the "evidence ex-
cludes every possible hypothesis but the greater offense."53
In practice, before the jury is permitted to consider the LIO, it
must decide whether the defendant is guilty of the greater,
charged offense.54 Only if the jury acquits the defendant of the
greater offense can it consider whether the defendant is guilty of
the LIO.55 This "acquittal first" rule stems from the principle
that the jury should not reach a verdict based on compromise be-
tween jurors." Without the acquittal first rule, jurors might be
tempted to convict a defendant of a LIO if opinions of the jury
differ about the defendant's guilt of the charged offense.57 Be-
cause a conviction of the LIO is an implied acquittal of the great-
er offense, the prosecution cannot retry the defendant for the
greater offense under principles of double jeopardy.5"
The submission of a LIO to the jury may benefit the defense or
the prosecution depending on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. A LIO charge is advantageous to the prosecution
when the evidence at trial fails to satisfy pretrial expectations. 9
50. See People v. Henderson, 359 N.E.2d 1357, 1360 (N.Y. 1976).
51. People v. Green, 437 N.E.2d 1148, 1150-51 (N.Y. 1982).
52. Henderson, 359 N.E.2d at 1360 ("the [evidentiary] test is not that it is
probable that the [lesser included offense] was actually committed or even that
there is substantial evidence to support such a view").
53. People v. Logan, 198 A.D.2d 439, 440 (N.Y. 1993).
54. People v. Boettcher, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98 (N.Y. 1987).
55. Id.
56. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Boettcher, such compromise might
result from sympathy for the defendant or to appease those who do not agree
with the majority. Id.
57. Id.
58. See N.Y. C~iM. PROC. LAW § 40.20, § 300.50(4).
59. See People v. Green, 437 N.E.2d 1148, 1150 (N.Y. 1982). Originally, only
the prosecution had the power to request a lesser included offense charge because
the rule was designed to benefit the prosecution. Since 1978, both the defendant
and prosecution are permitted to "request and obtain the benefit from a lesser
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Unexpectedly weak testimony or evidence that does not establish
an element of the charged offense necessitates an acquittal unless
the court presents the jury with a LIO.6'
A LIO charge may benefit the defense as well, because it af-
fords the jury a "less drastic alternative than the choice between
acquittal and conviction of the offense charged."'" In theory, the
jury must acquit the defendant if all of the elements of the
charged offense are not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. How-
ever, without a LIO for the jury to consider, the defendant might
be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice will di-
verge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense
charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of
some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of
conviction."
When the court submits a lesser included offense to the jury
pursuant to section 300.50, such submission "prevents polarized
distortion of the fact-finding process and allows verdicts that
reflect the appropriate degree of guilt established by the
proof."63
III. APPLYING THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE DOCTRINE To
NEW YORK'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL STATUTES
Article 71 of the New York Environmental Conservation Law
("ECL") is divided into 44 titles that contain New York State's
environmental enforcement statutes. 64 These statutes impose a
variety of criminal penalties on environmental offenders. The
statutes are categorized by title according to the type of environ-
mental offense that they criminalize.65 Because the determination
included offense charge." See Laura Anne Cooper, Should Juries Be Able to
Agree to Disagree?, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1027, 1039 (1988).
60. See Green, 437 N.E.2d at 1150.
61. Id.
62. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973).
63. See generally, Gegan supra note 4.
64. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, article 71.
65. The statutes of each title of article 71 enforce the regulatory and prohibi-
tive statutes of particular articles of the ECL. For example, title 29 of article 71
enforces the statutes of article 33 of the ECL, entitled, "Pesticides." See N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, title 29, article 71.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
of the LIOs of environmental offenses requires theoretical com-
parison of the statutory definitions, lesser included offense analy-
sis may be performed on these article 71 statutes in the abstract.
Of the 44 titles in article 71, only titles 19 (enforcing penalties
for water pollution offenses), 27 (criminalizing acts involving
hazardous wastes and substances), and 44 (prohibiting unlawful
possession and release of medical wastes) contain LIOs. 6 The
tables below identify the LIOs of these three titles. The offenses
set forth in the other titles of article 71 do not fulfill the require-
ments demanded by LIO analysis.
Part A of the following discussion provides a step-by-step
demonstration of LIO analysis, using Unlawful Possession of
Hazardous Waste to exemplify the process. 7 After showing the
relevant LIO analysis, part A identifies the results of the analysis
and presents the findings in tables. Additionally, part A identi-
fies' the hazardous substance LIOs, organizing these offenses in
tabular form as well. Parts B and C present tables reflecting the
medical waste and water pollution LIOs, respectively.69
A. Application of Lesser Included Offense Analysis to
Hazardous Waste and Substance Offenses
Title 27 of article 71 of the ECL contains the criminal statutes
penalizing unlawful conduct involving hazardous wastes and
substances. The LIOs in this title are identified by performing
LIO analysis on (1) First and Second Degree Unlawful Posses-
sion of Hazardous Wastes,7 ° (2) the sections criminalizing viola-
tions of hazardous and solid waste regulations,7' and (3) First,
Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Degree Endangering Public
66. See infra.
67. Hazardous waste offenses are criminalized in title 27 of the ECL.
68. After applying LIO analysis to the hazardous waste possession offenses in
part III(A)(1)(a),(b),(c), and (d) of this discussion, LIO analysis results, rather
than demonstrations of the process, will be displayed for the other environmental
offenses that pass LIO analysis muster.
69. Medical waste offenses are criminalized in title 44; water pollution in title
19.
70. ECL §§ 71-2707(1), (2), (3) and 71-2709(1), (2), (3).
71. ECL §§ 71-2705(2), 71-2703(2)(a), 71-2703(2)(b), and 71-2703(2)(c)
(these titles regulate waste transmitter permits and solid waste management).
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Health, Safety or the Environment. The remaining offenses of
title 27 do not satisfy the standards of the LIO doctrine.72
1. Offenses Involving Unlawful Possession
Sections 71-2707 and 71-2709 penalize Unlawful Possession of
72. The Unlawful Dealing in Hazardous Wastes offenses are the possible
exception. See infra Appendix A. The putative lesser included offense, Unlawful
Dealing in Hazardous Wastes in the Second Degree has two subdivisions: the
gravamen of the conduct prohibited by the first is that the actor seeks to cause
another person to possess or dispose of hazardous wastes without authorization;
the gravamen of the second subdivision is that the actor provides someone who
intends to possess or dispose of hazardous wastes with the means or opportunity
to do so which, in fact, aids that person to commit such act. N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 71-2715. The second subdivision is virtually identical to the
crime of criminal facilitation. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW, art. 115. Unlawful
Dealing in Hazardous Wastes in the First Degree has three subdivisions: the
gravamen of the first is that the actor "remove, assist in the removal, or make
available for removal" over 100 gallons or 1,000 pounds of hazardous wastes; the
second subdivision requires that the actor "solicit, agree to receive, or receive a
benefit" for possession or disposal of hazardous wastes without authorization; the
third requires that the actor, either himself or though someone else, "offer, agree
to confer, or confer upon another a benefit" for possession of hazardous wastes
without authorization. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 2717. The second subdivi-
sion of the lesser offense appears to require an element not required by any of
the three subdivisions of the greater offense, namely that the person aided by the
actor consummate the crime of possession or disposal. Therefore, this subdivi-
sion cannot be a lesser included offense of any of the First Degree Unlawful
Dealing crimes. The first subdivision of the lesser offense may be analyzed as: it
seems unlikely that it is a lesser included offense of the first subdivision of First
Degree Unlawful Dealing in that the lesser offense requires that the actor attempt
to cause someone else to possess or dispose of wastes, whereas the greater of-
fense could be interpreted to allow the actor to commit the crime himself (if the
requirement that the actor intend that wastes be possessed or disposed of by "a
person who does not have authorization" is construed to include possession or
disposal by the actor himself), it is not a lesser included offense of the second
subdivision of First Degree Unlawful Dealing because the lesser offense requires
that the actor attempt to cause someone else to possess or dispose of wastes,
which is not an element of the greater crime; and it is a lesser included offense
of the third subdivision of First Degree Unlawful Dealing because by offering,
agreeing to confer, or conferring a benefit upon someone to possess or dispose of
wastes, the actor necessarily has "attempt[ed] to cause such person to engage in
such conduct."
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
Hazardous Wastes. The following three examples demonstrate
lesser included offense analysis of Second Degree Unlawful Pos-
session of Hazardous Waste, Subdivision One ("Possession
20(1)"), as a potential LIO of the three subdivisions of Posses-
sion 10.
a. Example One
This example demonstrates LIO analysis applied to Possession
20(1) (section 71-2707(1) of the ECL). The "greater offense"
used in this analysis is Possession 10(1) (section 71-2709(1) of
the ECL).
STEP 1: List the elements
greater offense.
Lesser Offense 73
2nd Degree Possession of
Hazardous Wastes,
subdivision 1
Class E Felony
71-2707(1)
knowingly
possess
greater than 100 gallons
of hazardous wastes
at place other than
generation site
of the purported LIO and of the
Greater Offense 4
1st Degree Unlawful Posses-
sion of Hazardous Wastes,
subdivision 1
Class D Felony
71-2709(1)
knowingly
possess
acute hazardous wastes
at place other than
generation site
73. A person violates ECL § 71-2707(1) when he "knowingly possess[es]
more than one hundred gallons ... of an aggregate weight or volume of hazard-
ous wastes at a place other than the site of generation."
74. A person violates ECL § 71-2709(1) when he "knowingly possess[es]
acute hazardous wastes at a place other than the site of generation."
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STEP 2: Identify elements of the lesser offense that are also
elements of the greater offense and disregard those elements.75
Lesser Offense Greater Offense
71-2707(1) 71-2709(1)
knoewingly knewifigly
pessess pessess
greater than 100 gallons
of hazardous wastes acute hazardous wastes
at plaee ether than at plaee ether than
generatien site generatien-,t
STEP 3: Apply the impossibility test to those elements of the
lesser offense that differ from the elements of the greater offense.
The putative LIO (Possession 20(1)) requires possession of
hazardous wastes; whereas, the greater offense (Possession 10(1))
requires possession of acute hazardous wastes. The impossibility
test, as applied to the "hazardous waste" element of Possession
20(1), with respect to Possession 10(1) poses the question: is it
theoretically impossible to possess an acute hazardous waste
without simultaneously possessing a hazardous waste? By defimi-
tion, an acute hazardous waste is a hazardous waste.76 Accord-
ingly, no hypothetical circumstances exist in which an acute
hazardous waste is possessed without concomitant possession of a
hazardous waste. Thus, the element representing the type of waste
required by the putative LIO is subsumed by the greater offense,
and this hazardous waste element passes the impossibility test
with respect to the greater offense.
However, in addition to the difference in type of waste required
by the sections above, a difference exists with regard to the
amount of waste necessary. The putative LIO specifies that a
quantity greater than 100 gallons of hazardous waste be pos-
sessed; the greater offense does not specify a requisite quantity of
75. Elements of the lesser offense that are identical to elements of the greater
offense satisfy the impossibility test with respect to the greater offense. See supra
part I.
76. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0908(1)(c).
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
the waste.
Under the impossibility test, the relevant inquiry is whether, in
the abstract, it is impossible to possess any quantity of waste,
required by the greater offense, without concomitantly possessing
100 gallons of waste, required by the putative LIO.
Clearly, it is theoretically possible to possess an unspecified
amount of waste without possessing greater than 100 gallons.
Because this hypothetical situation exists, the quantity element of
the putative LIO is not subsumed by the greater offense and the
purported LIO fails the impossibility test. For this reason, Posses-
sion 20(1) is not a LIO of Possession 10(1).
b. Example Two
As in the example set forth above, this example applies LIO
analysis to Possession 20(1) (section 71-2707(1)of the ECL).
However, the greater offense involved in this evaluation is Pos-
session 10(2) (section 71-2709(2) of the ECL), as opposed to
Subdivision One of Possession 10 in the preceding example.
STEP 1: List the elements of the putative LIO and of the greater
offense.
Lesser Offense
2nd Degree Unlawful Possession of
Hazardous Wastes,
Wastes, subdivision 1
Class E Felony
71-2707(1)
knowingly
possess
greater than 100 gallons
of hazardous wastes
at place other than gener-
ation site
Greater Offense77
1st Degree Unlawful Pos-
session of Hazardous
Wastes, subdivision 2
Class D Felony
71-2709(2)
knowingly
possess
greater than 1,500 gallons
of hazardous wastes
at place other than gener-
ation site
77. A person violates ECL § 71-2709(2) when he "knowingly possess[es]
more than fifteen hundred gallons ... of an aggregate weight or volume of haz-
ardous wastes at a place other than the site of generation."
19961
756 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
STEP 2: Identify elements of the lesser offense that are also
elements of the greater offense and disregard those elements.
Lesser Offense Greater Offense
71-2707(1) 71-2709(2)
kniewingly knewiingly
possess possess
greater than 100 gallons greater than 1,500 gallons
of hazardetus wastes of hazafdeus wastes
at plaee other than gener- at place other than gener
atien-site ten-site
STEP 3: Apply the impossibility test to those elements of the
lesser offense that differ from the elements of the greater offense.
The putative LIO (Possession 20(1)) requires possession of
more than 100 gallons of hazardous wastes; whereas the greater
offense (Possession 10 (2)) involves possession of more than
1,500 gallons.
Under the impossibility test as applied to the quantity element
of Possession 20(1), with respect to Possession 10(2), the rele-
vant question is whether it is impossible to possess greater than
1,500 gallons of a substance, required by the greater offense
without necessarily possessing greater than 100 gallons of the
same substance, required by the putative LIO. Clearly, it is im-
possible to possess more than 1,500 gallons of a substance with-
out possessing more 100 gallons of the same substance. Because
every other element of the putative LIO is an element of the
greater offense, and because the element unique to the putative
LIO satisfies the impossibility test, Possession 20(1) is a lesser
included offense of Possession 10(2).
c. Example Three
This example modifies the above analysis by evaluating the
purported LIO, Possession 20(1) (section 71-2702(1) of ECL),
with respect to Possession 10(3) (section 71-2709(3) of ECL).
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
STEP 1: List the elements of
greater offense.
Lesser Offense
2nd Degree Unlawful Pos-
session of
Wastes, subdivision 1
Class E Felony
71-2707(1)
knowingly
possess
greater than 100 gallons
of hazardous wastes
at place other than gener-
ation site
the purported LIO and of the
Greater Offense78
1st Degree Unlawful Pos-
session of Hazardous
Wastes, subdivision 3
Class D Felony
71-2709(3)
recklessly
possess
greater than 2,500 gallons
of hazardous wastes
at place other than gener-
ation site
STEP 2: Identify elements of the lesser offense that are identical
to elements of the greater offense and disregard those elements.
Lesser Offense
71-2707(1)
knowingly
possess
greater than 100 gallons
,f hazadous wastes
A plaee ether than gener-
mtien site
Greater Offense
71-2709(3)
recklessly
pessesr
greater than 2,500 gallons
ef hazardeas wastes
at placc ether than gefer
atien ste
STEP 3: Apply the impossibility test to those elements of the
lesser offense that differ from the elements of the greater offense.
The quantity and mens rea elements of the putative LIO are
different from the corresponding elements of the greater offense.
For the quantity element, the relevant inquiry concerns whether
78. A person violates ECL § 71-2709(3) when he "recklessly possess[es]
more than twenty-five hundred gallons ... of an aggregate weight or volume of
hazardous wastes at a place other than the site of generation."
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it is impossible to possess greater than 2,500 gallons of a sub-
stance, required by the greater offense without concomitantly
possessing greater than 100 gallons of the same substance, re-
quired by the putative LIO. Because it is impossible to possess
greater than 2,500 gallons of a substance without simultaneously
possessing 100 gallons of the same substance, the volume ele-
ment unique to the putative LIO satisfies the impossibility test
with respect to the greater offense.
As to the requisite mental state of the two crimes, the question
is whether it is theoretically impossible to "recklessly" possess a
substance, required by the greater offense, without "knowingly"
possessing the same substance, required by the putative LIO.
"Knowingly" involves a higher degree of culpability than the
mental state "recklessly." Putative LIOs with more culpable men-
tal states do not satisfy the impossibility test with respect to
greater offenses requiring lower mental states.79 The impossibili-
ty test fails when applied to the mens rea element of Possession
20(1) with respect to Possession 10(3). Therefore, Possession
20(1) is not a lesser included offense of Possession 10(3).
d. Summary of Analysis Applied to Possession 20(2)
The detailed demonstration of LIO analysis performed above
on Possession 20(1) with respect to the three subdivisions of
Possession 10 is now repeated but applied to the Second Subdivi-
sion of Possession 2080 for the three subdivisions of Possession
10. Rather than demonstrating each step individually, as in the
example above, the analysis is summarized below.
The left column represents LIO analysis applied to Possession
20(2) (ECL section 71-2707(2)) for Possession 10(1) (ECL sec-
tion 71-2709(1)); the center column for Possession 10(2) (ECL
section 71-2709(2)); the right column, for Possession 10 (3)
(ECL section 71-2709(3)).
79. See supra part I.
80. A person violates ECL § 71-2707(2) when he "recklessly possess[es]
more than two hundred gallons ... of an aggregate weight or volume of hazard-
ous wastes at a place other than the site of generation."
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
STEP I
Lesser Greater
71-2707(2) 71-2709(1)
recklessly knowingly
possess possess
> than
200 gal
of HW acute HW
at place other than
generation site
STEP 2
Lesser Greater
71-2707(2) 71-2709(1)
recklessly knowingly
possess pesess
> than
200 gal
of HW acute HW
ict plaee etherta
geneFotien t-*e
STEP 3
It is IMPOSSIBLE to
possess knowingly
without possessing
recklessly.
)
STEP 1
Lesser Greater
71-2707(2) 71-2709(2)
recklessly knowingly
possess possess
> than >than
200 gal 1,500 gal
of HW of HW
at place other than
generation site
STEP 2
Lesser Greater
71-2707(2) 71-2709(2)
recklessly knowingly
ssess possess
> than > than
200 gal 1,500 gal
of HAI ef W
fit plaee other than
gener-atien site
STEP 3
It is IMPOSSIBLE to
possess knowingly
without possessing
recklessly.
It is POSSIBLE to possess
any amount of a substance
without possessing greater
than 200 gallons of the
substance. One could
possess, for
example, 10 or 30
gallons of the substance.
It is IMPOSSIBLE to
possess 1,500 gallons
of a substance without
concomitantly possessing
200 gallons of the
substance.
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STEP 1
Lesser Greater
71-2707(2) 71-2709(3)
recklessly recklessly
possess possess
> than > than
200 gal 2,500 gal
of HW of HW
at place other than
generation site
STEP 2
Lesser Greater
71-2707(2) 71-2709(3)
feelessly -eldessly
posses pessess
> than > than
200 gal 2,500 gal
ot plaee cthzr ha
geeefaie sit
STEP 3
It is IMPOSSIBLE to
posses 2,500 gallons
of a substance without
concomitantly possess-
ing 200 gallons of the
substance.
)
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It is IMPOSSIBLE to possess
acute HW without
concomitantly possessing
HW. All acute
HWs are HWs.
CONCLUSION
71-2707(2) is not a lesser
included offense of
71-2709(1)
because the lesser
fails the
Impossibility test with
respect to the greater.
CONCLUSION
71-2707(2) is a lesser
included offense of
71-2709(2)
because the lesser
meets the
Impossibility test with
respect to the greater.
CONCLUSION
71-2707(2) is a lesser
included offense of
71-2709(3)
because the lesser
meets the
Impossibility test with
respect to the greater.
e. Table Representing Possession of Hazardous Waste LIOs
Table I represents the results of LIO analysis demonstrated in
the analysis above. The arrows connect the LIOs to their greater
offenses.
Second Degree Unlawful Possession of Hazardous Wastes
(E Felony) 71-2707(1) 71-2707(2)
First Degree Unlawful Possession of Hazardous Wastes
(D Felony) 71-2709(1) 71-2709(2) 71-2709(3)
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2. Offenses Involving Waste Transmitter Permits and Solid
Waste Management
Table II represents results derived from applying LIO analysis
to offenses involving waste transmitter permits (regulated by title
3 of article 27 in the ECL) and solid waste management (regulat-
ed by title 7 of article 27 of the ECL). The statute defining the
offense of violating title 3 or 7 of article 27 is section 71-2703 of
the ECL.s'
As in the table above, the arrows connect the LIOs to their
greater offenses. Additionally, it is important to note that by a
principle similar to the commutative property of mathematics, any
LIO of a greater offense is a LIO of every offense connected to
that greater offense, as long as those offense are of higher grade
than the original LIO.
81. Section 71-2703 was amended, effective January 1, 1996, to provide for
increased sanctions for those who (a) release certain quantities of solid waste into
the environment and/or (b) have prior convictions under the statute. (L. 1995, ch
508, eff Jan 1, 1996) N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2703. The analysis that
follows in the text of this Article involves the new statute and interprets the ag-
gravating quantity factor as an element of the different crimes while the prior
conviction factor is considered to be an increased sentencing provision. If, how-
ever, the prior conviction factor is considered to be an element of the different
crimes as well, then the lesser included relationship of the various crimes under
the statute would be as follows, with each offense being a necessarily lesser
included offense of every other offense appearing above it:
Class E felony:
§71-2703(c)(ii) [over 70 yds./prior conviction]
Class A misdemeanor:
§ 71-2703(c)(i) [over 70 yds.] and § 71-2703(b)(ii) [over 10 yds/prior convic-
tion]
Class B misdemeanor:
§ 71-2703(b)(i) [over 10 yds.]
Violation:
§ 71-2703(a)
Thus, for example, either of the class A misdemeanor crimes, §§ 71-2703(c)(i)
and 71-2703(b)(ii), would be lesser included offenses of the class E felony crime,
§ 71-2703(c)(ii), and would have the class B misdemeanor crime, § 71-
2703(b)(i), and violation, § 71-2703(a), as their lesser included offenses, but
would not be lesser included offenses of each another.
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Lesser Offense
71-2703(2)(a) (Violation)
culpable mental state
violates title 3 and 7 of article 27
or any rules, regulations, final determinations
Lesser Offense with respect to the above offense
Greater Offense with respect to the following offense
71-2703(2)(b)(i) (B Misdemeanor)
violates 71-2703(2)(a)
causes or attempts to cause release
of greater than 10 cubic yards of solid wastes0 1
Greater Offense
71-2703(2)(c)(i) (A Misdemeanor)
violates 71-2703(2)(a)
causes or attempts to cause release
of greater than 70 cubic yards of solid wastes
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3. Offenses Involving Release of Hazardous Substances
Table III displays the results of LIO analysis applied to the
First through Fifth Degrees of Endangering the Public Health,
Safety or the Environment.82
Fifth Dearee (B Misdemeanor)
71-2710
criminally negligent
release
of > than 5gal
of a hazardous substance
Fourth Dearee (AMiscemeanor)
71-271 1(l)
criminally negligent
release
of an acute HS2 II
71-27 2() 71-2
recklessly reck
release reles
of an acute HS > thi
of ft
knowingly knowingly
release release
HS & acute HS
cause phys.inj, or violate
71 -271(2)
criminally negligent
release
of> than 1 00gal
of a hazardous substance
71-2711(3)
knowingly or recklessly
release
of a hazardous substance
knowingly recklessly knowingly
release release release
> than 1.500gal an acute HS & > than 100gal
HS cause phys.inj. HS that
know or reck
release
HS that
enters H20 sup
37-0103 enters H2 0
71-271[4l. 1- 714(2
intentionally knowingly
release release
an acute HS an acute HS
or violate 37-0103 or violate 37-0103
& is aware & causes physical injury
creates subtantial risk of serious phys. inj.
82. See infra Appendix A.
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4. The Catch-All Lesser Included Offense of the Hazardous
Waste Felonies
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor offense under section 71-
2705(2) of the ECL when, having a culpable mental state, he
violates any provision of titles 9, 11, or 13 of article 27 or any
rule or regulation promulgated thereunder. Because these three
titles of article 27 exclusively concern hazardous wastes, sec-
tion 71-2705(2) is not a lesser included offense of any of the
hazardous substance felonies.8 3 Within title 9 of article 27,
however, section 27-0914 prohibits unauthorized possession,
disposal, or dealing in hazardous wastes. Because a person could
not commit any of the hazardous waste felonies -- Unlawful
Possession of Hazardous Wastes in the First and Second De-
grees84 and Unlawful Dealing in Hazardous Wastes in the First
Degree85 -- without concomitantly violating § 27-0914, § 71-
2705(2) is a lesser included offense of the hazardous waste felo-
nies in article 71.
B. Application of Lesser Included Offense Doctrine to Medical
Waste Offenses
The following tables identify the medical waste lesser included
offenses. The medical waste LIOs are identified by applying the
LIO analysis to the criminal enforcement statutes of title 44 of
article 71 of the ECL. Section 71-4402(2)(a), a violation, is a
LIO of every greater medical waste offense. Section 71-
4402(2)(b), a B misdemeanor, is a catchall lesser included offense
of every greater medical waste offense that requires at least a
reckless mental state. Section 71-4402(2)(a) is a lesser included
offense of section 71-4402(2)(b).86
83. While every hazardous waste is, by definition, a hazardous substance (See
N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2702(10)(a)), the converse is not true. Thus,
it is always theoretically possible to commit a hazardous substance crime without
concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, a hazardous waste crime.
84. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§71-2709 and 71-2707.
85. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2717.
86. Because each medical waste felony or class A misdemeanor set forth in
title 44 of article 71 requires at least a reckless mental state and is virtually cer-
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1. LIO Analysis Performed on Medical Waste Possession
Offenses
Table IV represents the results of applying LIO analysis to the
subdivisions of First and Second Degree Unlawful Possession of
Medical Wastes.
71-4403(l) (A
knowingly & i
possess
greater than 20
of Medical Wa
place other tha
I
Second Degree Unlawful Possession of Regulated Medical Waste
Misdemeanor) 71-4403(2) (A Misdemeanor)
ntentionally recklessly
possess
gallons greater than 40 gallons
ste at of Medical Waste at
n generation site place other than generation site
First Degree Unlawful Possession of Regulated Medical Waste
71-4404(1) (E Felony)
knowingly and intentionally
possess
greater than 300 gallons
of Medical Waste at
place other than generation site
71-4404(2) (E Felony)
recklessly
possess
greater than 500 gallons
of Medical Waste at
place other than generation site
tain to proscribe conduct that would violate some provision or regulation of title
15 of article 27, the conclusion that § 71-4402(2)(b), a class B misdemeanor, is a
lesser included offense of every higher grade medical waste crime is based on in-
tuition as opposed to empirical analysis. On this basis, § 71-4402(2)(a), a viola-
tion requiring no culpable mental state, is a lesser included offense of every med-
ical waste crime, including § 71-4402(2)(b). Similar reasoning dictates that § 71-
1933(1) is a catchall lesser included offense for the water pollution felonies set
forth in § 71-1933(4) and (5). See infra part III (C). Nonetheless, for these
catchall crimes, practioners are urged to find a specific provision or regulation
subsumed by the putative greater crime in order to verify that the catchall crime
is, in fact, a lesser included offense of such crime.
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2. LIO Analysis Performed on Medical Waste Release Offenses
Table V represents the results of LIO analysis of Unlawful
Releases of Medical Wastes.
Fourth Degree Unlawful Release of Regulated Medical Waste
71-4405 (B Misdemeanor)
with criminal negligence
engages in conduct that causes the release of
regulated medical wastes
Third Degree Unlawful Release of Reulated Medical Waste
71-4406(f) (A Misdemeanor) 71-4406(2) (A Misdetnor)
recklessly knowingly
causes the release of causes the release of
medical waste m I waste
Second Degree Unlawful Release of" Resulated Medical Waste
71-4407(l) (E Felony) 71-4407(2) (E Felony)
knowingly or recklessly knowing or recklessly
causes the release of causes the release of
medical waste greater than 500 gal
that includes any amount capable of medical waste
of causing disease or that constitutes a single
physical injury criminal transaction
F iro~ Qe ~ree T Tnla.Wftil R.elease o~f Re :dnr I wpd," Wcte
71-4408(l) (D Felony)
knowingly
cause the release of
medical waste
that includes any amount capable
of causing serious physical
injury or death
71-4408(2) (D Felony)
knowingly
cause the release of
greater than 1000 gal
of medical waste
that constitutes a single
criminal transaction
4
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C. Application of Lesser Included Offense Doctrine to Water
Pollution Offenses
The Water Pollution lesser included offenses are identified by
applying LIO analysis to the criminal enforcement statutes of title
19 of article 71.87 Section 71-1933(1) is a catchall lesser includ-
ed offense of every greater water pollution offense. Section 71-
1933(1) imposes a misdemeanor penalty on a defendant who vio-
lates, with a culpable mental state, the provisions of titles 1-5, 9-
11, and 19 of article 17 of the ECL.88
Lesser Offense
71-1933(3) (A Misdemeanor)
with criminal negligence
violates titles 7 and 8 of article 17
or introduces hazardous substance
knew likely to cause personal injury or property damage
or causes treatment works
violate permit, rules, regulations
L
Lesser Offense with respect to the above offense
Greater Offense with respect to the following offense
71-1933(4) (E Felony)
knowingly
violates titles 7 and 8 of article 17
or introduces hazardous substance
knew was likely to cause personal injury
or causes treatment works
violate, permit, rules, regulations
I
Greater Offense
71-1933(5) (C Felony)
intentionally
violates title 7 or 8 of article 17
and
knows places another
in imminent danger of death or serious injury
87. See Appendix B.
88. ECL § 71-1933(1) is the general criminal sanction statute of water pollu-
tion analogous to the general criminal sanction statute, § 71-4402(2), of medical
waste offenses; see supra part Ill(B).
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IV. CONCLUSION
As in all criminal prosecutions, criminal cases brought under
the New York Environmental Conservation Law require a work-
ing knowledge of lesser included offenses. In order to perform
their duties effectively, judges, prosecutors, and the defense bar
need to know with certainty which crimes are - or are not -
lesser included offenses. Yet, given that most judges, prosecu-
tors, and defense attorneys encounter Environmental Conservation
Law prosecutions so infrequently, they may not fully explore the
potential lesser included offenses involved in their cases.
In New York, lesser included offense analysis is performed as
a purely theoretical exercise, without reference to the particular
facts of a given case. Because of this, the crimes set forth in the
Environmental Conservation Law can be evaluated in the abstract
to determine the underlying lesser included offense relationships.
Having conducted such evaluation in this Article, we hope that it
serves as a useful reference guide to facilitate simpler understand-
ing of the myriad of lesser included offense issues lurking within
environmental prosecutions.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
Appendix A
New York Environmental Conservation Law
§ 71-2710. Endangering public health, safety or the environment
in the fifth degree.
A person is guilty of endangering public health, safety, or the
environment in the fifth degree when with criminal negligence he
engages in conduct which causes the release to the environment
of more than five gallons or fifty pounds, whichever is less, of an
aggregate weight or volume of a substance hazardous to the pub-
lic health, safety or the environment. Endangering public health,
safety or the environment is a class B misdemeanor.
§ 71-2711. Endangering public health, safety or the environment
in the fourth degree.
A person is guilty of endangering public health, safety or the
environment in the fourth degree when: (1) With criminal negli-
gence, he engages in conduct which causes the release to the
environment of a substance acutely hazardous to public health,
safety or the environment; or (2) With criminal negligence, he
engages in conduct which causes the release to the environment
of more than one hundred gallons or one thousand pounds,
whichever is less, of an aggregate weigh or volume of a sub-
stance hazardous to public health, safety or the environment; or
(3) He knowingly or recklessly engages in conduct which causes
the release to the environment of a substance hazardous to public
health, safety or the environment. Endangering public health,
safety or the environment in the fourth degree is a class A misde-
meanor.
§ 71-2712. Endangering public health, safety or the environment
in the third degree.
A person is guilty of endangering public health, safety or the
environment in the third degree when: (1) He recklessly engages
in conduct which causes the release to the environment of a sub-
stance acutely hazardous to public health, safety or the environ-
ment; or (2) recklessly engages in conduct which causes the
release to the environment of more than two hundred gallons or
two thousand pounds, whichever is less, of an aggregate weight
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or volume of a substance hazardous to public health, safety or the
environment; or (3) He recklessly engages in conduct which
causes the release to the environment of more than one hundred
gallons, or one thousand pounds, whichever is less, of an aggre-
gate weight or volume of a substance hazardous to the public
health, safety or the environment and such a release creates a
substantial risk of physical injury to a person who is not a partici-
pant in the crime; or (4) He knowingly engages in conduct which
causes the release to the environment of more than one hundred
gallons or one thousand pounds, whichever is less, of an aggre-
gate weight or volume of a substance hazardous to public safety
or the environment. Endangering public health, safety or the
environment in the third degree is a class E felony.
§ 71-2713. Endangering public health, safety or the environment
in the second degree.
A person is guilty of endangering public health, safety or the
environment in the second degree when: (1) He knowingly en-
gages in conduct which causes the release to the environment of
a substance hazardous to the public health, safety or the environ-
ment and such release causes physical injury to any person who
is not a participant in the crime; or (2) He knowingly engages in
conduct which causes the release to the environment of a sub-
stance acutely hazardous to the public health, safety or the envi-
ronment or the release of a substance which at the time of the
conduct he knows to meet any of the criteria set forth in para-
graph (b) of subdivision one of section 37-0103 of this chapter;
or (3) He knowingly engages in conduct which causes the release
to the environment of more than one thousand five hundred gal-
lons or 15 [sic.] pounds, whichever is less of an aggregate weight
or volume of a substance hazardous to the public health, safety or
the environment; or (4) He recklessly engages in conduct which
causes the release to the environment of a substance acutely haz-
ardous to the public health, safety or the environment and such
release causes physical injury to any person who is not a partici-
pant in the crime; or (5) He knowingly engages in conduct which
causes the release to the environment of more than one hundred
gallons or one thousand pounds, whichever is less, of an aggre-
gate weight or volume of a substance hazardous to the public
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
health, safety or the environment and such substance enters water;
or (6) He knowingly or recklessly engages in conduct which
causes the release to the environment of a substance hazardous to
the public health, safety or the environment and such substance
enters a primary water supply. Endangering public health, safety
or the environment in the second degree is a class D felony.
§ 71-2714. Endangering public health, safety or the environment
in the first degree.
A person is guilty of endangering public health, safety or the
environment in the first degree when: (1) He intentionally en-
gages in conduct which causes the release to the environment of
a substance acutely hazardous to public health, safety or the envi-
ronment or the release of a substance which at the time of the
conduct he knows to meet any of the criteria set forth in para-
graph (b) of subdivision one of section 37-0103 of this chapter
when he is aware that such conduct creates a substantial risk of
serious physical injury to anyone who is not a participant in the
crime; or (5) He knowingly engages in conduct which causes the
release to the environment of a substance acutely hazardous to
the public health, safety or the environment or the release of a
substance which at the time of the conduct he knows to meet any
of the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of
section 37-0103 of this chapter and such release causes physical
injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime. Endan-
gering public health, safety or the environment in the .first degree
is a class C felony.
§ 71-2715. Unlawful dealing in hazardous wastes in the second
degree.
No person shall:
1. With intent that another person possess or dispose of hazard-
ous wastes without authorization, solicit, request, command, im-
portune or otherwise attempt to cause such other person to en-
gage in such conduct;
or
2. Believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person
who intends to possess or dispose of hazardous wastes without
authorization, engage in conduct which provided such person with
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the means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which
in fact aids such person to commit such act.
Unlawful dealing in hazardous waste in the second degree is a
class A misdemeanor.
§ 71-2717. Unlawful dealing in hazardous wastes in the first de-
gree.
No person shall:
1. Remove, assist in the removal, or make available for remov-
al, more than one hundred gallons or one thousand pounds,
whichever is less, of an aggregate weight or volume of hazardous
wastes intending that such wastes are to be possessed or disposed
of by a person who does not have authorization; or
2. Solicit, agree to receive or receive a benefit for possession or
disposal of hazardous wastes intending that the possession or dis-
posal is to be done without authorization; or
3. Offer, agree to confer, confer upon another a benefit for pos-
session or disposal of hazardous wastes intending that the person
who is to perform such possession or disposal does not have
authorization.
Unlawful dealing in hazardous waste in the first degree is a
class E felony.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
Appendix B
New York Environmental Conservation Law
§ 71-1933 Violations; criminal liability.
(3) Any person who with criminal negligence as defined in sec-
tion 15.05 of the penal law,
(a) violates
(i) any provision of title 7 or 8 of article 17 of this chapter, or
(ii) the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder, or
(iii) any term of any permit issued thereunder, or
(iv) any requirement imposed in a pretreatment program approved
pursuant to section 402(a)(3) or 402(b)(8) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) or § 1342(b)(8)) or
approved pursuant to title 7 or 8 of article 17 of this chapter, or
(v) any final administrative order issued pursuant to this article
where an opportunity for a hearing is provided, or
(b) introduces into a sewer system or publicly owned treatment
works any pollutant or hazardous substance
(i) when such person knew that such introduction was likely to
cause personal injury or property damage, except if that introduc-
tion was in compliance with all applicable federal, state or local
requirements or permits, or
(ii) which causes the treatment works to violate any term of any
permit issued under title 7 or 8 of article 17 of this chapter or the
rules or regulations promulgated thereunder except if that intro-
duction was in compliance with all applicable federal, state or
local requirements or permits; shall be guilty of a class A misde-
meanor.
(4) Any person who knowingly as defined by section 15.05 of the
penal law,
(a) violates
(i) any provision of title 7 or 8 of article 17 of this chapter, or
(ii) the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder, or
(iii) any term of any permit issued thereunder, or
(iv) any requirement imposed in a pretreatment program approved
pursuant to section 402(a)(3) or 402(b)(8) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (33 USC S 1342(a)(3) or S 1342(b)(8)) or
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approved pursuant to title 7 or 8 of article 17 of this chapter, or
(v) any final administrative order issued pursuant to this article
where an opportunity for a hearing was provided, or
(b) introduces into a sewer system or publicly owned treatment
works any pollutant or hazardous substance
(i) when such person knew that such introduction was likely to
cause personal injury, except if that introduction was in compli-
ance with all applicable federal, state or local requirements or
permits, or
(ii) which causes the treatment works to violate any term of any
permit issued under title 7 or 8 of article 17 of this chapter or the
rules or regulations promulgated thereunder except if that intro-
duction was in compliance with all applicable federal, state or
local requirements or permits; shall be guilty of a class E felony.
(5) Any person who intentionally as defined in section 15.05 of
the penal law,
(a) violates
(i) any provision of title 7 or 8 of article 17 of this chapter, or
(ii) the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder, or
(iii) any term of any permit issued thereunder, or
(iv) any final administrative orders issued pursuant to this article
where an opportunity for a hearing was provided, and
(b) knows at the time that he thereby places another person who
is not a participant in the crime in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury shall be guilty of a class C felony.
